BULL RUN, VA (From
Ancestry.com)
JULY 21, 1861
Bull Run, Va., July 21, 1861. U. S. Forces under Gen. McDowell. The
battle of Bull Run was the first engagement of consequence in the
war. The seizure of Gosport and Harper's Ferry by the Virginia
state troops the destruction of the Norfolk navy yard; the Baltimore
riots, and the threatening attitude of the Confederates toward the
national capital had aroused general indignation at the North, and
public sentiment clamored for a battle which would crush the rebellion
in its incipiency. "Forward to Richmond" was the slogan of the Northern
newspapers and members of Congress urged the president and Gen. Scott,
the latter being in command of the Union army, to strike a decisive
blow. Virginia, by popular vote, ratified a secession ordinance on
May 23, and the next day Union troops crossed the Potomac and occupied
Arlington Heights and Alexandria. But this movement was not
sufficiently aggressive to satisfy the general demand for a fight, and
when a train of soldiers belonging to Gen. Schenck's command was
ambushed at Vienna Station, and a detachment of Gen. Butler's forces was
defeated at Big Bethel, the fires of patriotism blazed with a fiercer
intensity. When the Federals occupied Alexandria and Arlington the
Confederates fell back to Manassas Junction, about 35 miles from
Washington, where Beauregard was assigned to the command on June 1.
Beauregard immediately issued his famous proclamation, declaring the war
cry of the Union army to be "Beauty and Booty," and called on the
surrounding farmers to join his own forces. Some responded in person
others sent their slaves, and the work of fortifying a position was
commenced. At that time the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah,
commanded by Gen. J. E. Johnston and numbering about 10,000 men, was at
Harper's Ferry, threatened by the Union forces under Gen.
Patterson. To favor Patterson's attack on Johnston, by preventing
Beauregard from sending reinforcements to Harper's Ferry, a movement was
planned against the later at Manassas, and on June 3, Scott called on
Gen. McDowell, who was in command of the troops south of the Potomac, to
give an estimate of the number of men necessary for the undertaking.
Before the movement could be carried out Johnston evacuated Harper's
Ferry and the order was recalled for the time being. This action again
awakened the public demand for an advance on the enemy at some point and
on the 24th, McDowell submitted his plan for an attack on Beauregard.
Five days later this plan was thoroughly reviewed by a council of war at
the Executive Mansion, and was finally approved by the president and his
cabinet, as well as the principal military officers present. Scott was
opposed to assuming the aggressive just then, for the reason that most
of the troops were three months men, whose terms would expire before any
movement of an extensive nature could be carried through.
Notwithstanding these objections it was decided to make the attack and
McDowell was ordered to have his troops in readiness to begin the
advance on July 8.
In proposing his plan of campaign, McDowell estimated the
Confederate strength at Manassas at 25,000 men, and asked for 30,000 to
take into action, with a reserve of 1O,OOO more. His greatest fear seems
to have been that Beauregard would be reinforced, for in presenting his
plan he said: "If Gen. J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Maj.Gen.
Patterson, and Maj.Gen. Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I
think they will not be able to bring up more than 10,000 men, so we may
calculate upon having to do with about 35,000 men. "Scott assured
him that Patterson would keep Johnston too busy to permit him to join
Beauregard, and added : "If Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have
Patterson on his heels." Events proved, however, that Scott was mistaken
in his estimate of Patterson as a military commander. Johnston did join
Beauregard, just in the nick of time, and Patterson was nowhere near his
heels. Some delay occurred in the preparations, so that it was the 16th
before McDowell was ready to move. His army was composed of five
divisions. The 1st division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler,
consisted of four brigades, the 1st commanded by Col. E. D. Keyes, the
2nd by Brig.-Gen. R. C. Schenck, the 3rd by Col. W. T. Sherman, and the
4th by Col. I. B. Richardson. The 2nd division was under the command of
Col. David Hunter, and was made up of two brigades commanded by Cols.
Andrew Porter and E. Burnside. The 3rd division, under Col. S. P.
Heintzelman, consisted of three brigades commanded by Cols. W. B.
Franklin, O. B. Willcox and O. O. Howard. The 4th division, commanded by
Brig.-Gen. Theodore Runyon, was held in reserve and took no part in the
engagement. The 5th division, commanded by Col. S. D. Miles, was also in
reserve at Centerville, and was not in the battle proper, though it was
engaged in skirmishing during the 21st and in covering the retreat of
the army. It was composed of the brigades of Cols. Louis Blenker and T.
A. Davies. With the army were 49 pieces of artillery.
The Confederate Army of the Potomac, commanded by Brig.-
Gen. G. T. Beauregard, consisted of six brigades of Bonham, Ewell, D. R.
Jones, Longstreet, Cocke and Early; the reserve brigade of Holmes;
Evans' command, temporarily organized; two regiments of unattached
infantry, the 30th Va., ten independent companies of cavalry, and 27
field guns. The Army of the Shenandoah, commanded by Gen. J. E.
Johnston, was composed of four brigades, respectively commanded by
Jackson, Bartow, Bee and E. K. Smith, the 1st Va. cavalry, under J. E.
B. Stuart; and 17 pieces of artillery.
As above stated, McDowell marched on the 16th, the men
carrying three days' rations. The next day he drove in the enemy's
outposts at Fairfax C. H., and on the 18th halted at Centerville for his
supply train to come up, so that more rations could be issued. On
that day Tyler made a reconnaissance (see Blackburn's Ford) that
developed the Confederate position and demonstrated that the enemy was
in force. The Confederate line of battle lay along the west side of Bull
Run and extended from Manassas Junction to the stone bridge on the
Warrenton turnpike, a distance of about 8 miles. Between the railroad
and the stone bridge were five fords, viz.: Lewis', Ball's, Mitchell's,
Blackburn's and McLean's, from north to south in the order named.
Up to the time of the affair at Blackburn's ford it had been McDowell's
intention to turn the enemy's right, then cross at one of the fords and
attack the center. The roads south of the junction were found to be
unsuitable for a flank movement in that direction, and Tyler's
reconnaissance showed the enemy to be too strong at the fords for
the Union troops to force a passage without suffering heavy losses.
McDowell therefore, turned his attention to the Confederate left. During
the 19th and 20th he caused his engineers to make a careful examination
of the ground between the two armies, and to gain as much information as
possible of the enemy's position. Two fords were found above the stone
bridge, Sudley ford, the one farthest north, being unguarded. On
Saturday evening, the 20th McDowell called his officers together at
Centerville and explained his plans for battle on the succeeding day.
Miles was to remain at Centerville with his division and construct
defensive works there to be used in case of emergency; Richardson's
brigade was to be detached from Tyler's division for the purpose of
making a demonstration against Blackburn's ford, to engage the enemy's
attention in the center; the rest of Tyler's division was to march out
on the pike to the stone bridge and threaten the enemy at that point,
while Hunter and Heintzelman were to march with their divisions to
Sudley ford, cross the run and then, turning to the left, force away the
guard from the other ford and the bridge, thus clearing the way for
Tyler to cross and join in the attack on Beauregard's left. Tyler was
instructed to move at 2:30 a. m. and to be in position to open fire on
the bridge at daybreak. His demonstration was to be sufficiently
vigorous to divert attention from Hunter and Heintzelman. Unfortunately
Tyler started behind time and his march was so slow as to hold back
Hunter and Heintzelman for some time. Then the distance to Sudley ford
was about twice as great as had been reported, so that the run was not
crossed until 9:30 instead of 6 o'clock, according to the original
schedule.
The stone bridge was guarded by Evans' who had about a
regiment and a half of infantry and 4 pieces of artillery. Tyler's
demonstration was so feeble that Evans was soon convinced it was only a
feint and that the real attack was to come from some other quarter.
About 8 o'clock, he heard of the column moving toward Sudley ford.
Withdrawing all his force from the bridge, with the exception of four
companies and 2 guns, he moved to the Sudley road to intercept the flank
movement. This movement of Evans was made without the knowledge or the
orders of his superior officers, but it displayed good military
judgment, and no doubt changed the whole current of battle. He took up a
position north of the Warrentonpike, on a ridge north of Young's branch,
his left resting on the Sudley road. At 10 a. m. the head of Hunter's
column emerged from the woods about a mile north of the pike and the
battle of Bull Run was commenced by Burnside's brigade and Evans' line.
Johnston arrived at Manassas about noon on the 20th with
the first detachment of the Army of the Shenandoah, and, being the
ranking officer assumed command. Patterson was not "on his heels," as
Scott had promised, but he might arrive at any time, and it was decided
to crush McDowell before Patterson could reinforce him. Beauregard, who
was well acquainted with the ground, proposed a plan of battle,
which was approved by Johnston, and that was to cross Bull Run at the
fords below the stone bridge with the whole strength of the combined
armies and attack McDowell at Centerville. The troops were posted with
this view and early on Sunday morning Johnston had written the orders
for an advance, but before they could be carried out the sound of
artillery firing was heard in the direction of the stone bridge. It was
then decided to attack on the right from Blackburn's ford and assume the
defensive on the left. Accordingly orders were given for Ewell, on the
extreme right to begin the flank movement on Centerville, the other
commands to follow in order to the left, while the commands of Bee and
Bartow were to support Evans. The reserves were to move without further
orders to where the sound of the firing was heaviest.
When the fighting on the left began, Burnside formed his
brigade in line of battle and moved forward to the support of a battery
in the open field east of the Sudley road. Prompt action on his part
would doubtless have forced Evans from his position, but Evans was
quickly reinforced by part of Bee's command and the opportunity was
lost. Evans was also reinforced by Bartow's brigade and Imboden's
battery. Porter's brigade came to the assistance of Burnside and formed
to the right of the Sudley road, where Griffin's battery of 6 guns
could be brought to bear on the enemy's artillery. Heintzelman also
hurried up his advance regiment and Ricketts' battery, and under the
attack of these combined forces the Confederate line broke and fell back
in some confusion about half a mile across Young's branch. The Sudley
road crosses the Warrenton pike about three-fourths of a mile west
of the stone bridge. At the junction of the two roads was a stone house.
About half a mile east, on the south side of the pike, was the
Robinson house, and about the same distance west of the cross-roads on
the north side of the pike was the Dogan house, while further south, on
the east side of the Sudley road was another dwelling, known as the
Henry house. South of this last was a semicircular wood, extending from
the Sudley road to Young's branch, and between the wood and the pike was
a plateau, over which the Confederates retreated. It was at this point
that Gen. T. J. Jackson received the sobriquet of "Stonewall." His
brigade was in line near the edge of the wood, waiting for the command
to go in, when Bee's men came flying back across the plateau. "Look!"
called out Bee in an attempt to rally his forces, "Here is Jackson
standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" From that time
forth the famous Confederate general was known as "Stonewall" Jackson,
and there are probably thousands of people who know him by no other
name.
This first repulse of the Confederates came about
11:30 a. m. Some time before this Johnston and Beauregard realized that
McDowell's demonstration on their left was a real attack, the order for
the flank movement on Centerville was recalled, and the troops ordered
to the scene of the conflict. McDowell, who was early on the field, also
ordered up all his available forces to the support of those engaged.
Tyler sent the brigades of Sherman and Keyes across the run at the ford
above the stone bridge, Keyes joining Hunter on the left, while Sherman
moved to the right to the support of Porter, who was still
pressing the enemy down the Sudley road. Along the crest in front of the
wood Jackson, with his five regiments and two batteries, formed a new
line, extending from the Robinson to the Henry house, and behind this
the defeated Confederates were partially rallied. Hampton's
battalion, which had arrived from Richmond that morning, formed on
Jackson's right. Franklin and Willcox joined the Union line on the right
a little after noon, and Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries secured a
position near the Dogan house, where they could enfilade Hampton's
line. About 2 p. m. Keyes made a dashing charge up the hill, driving
Hampton from his position but was repulsed by the fire of some batteries
which had just been planted farther to the rear. The whole Federal line
now swung around toward the pike, striking Jackson on the left and
forcing him back to the shelter of the woods, where he concentrated his
artillery so as to sweep by a cross fire the whole open plateau in his
front. To counteract this fire Griffin and Ricketts pushed their
batteries forward to the Henry hill, with two regiments in support. For
a brief period there was a lull in the battle, but before the Union guns
were fairly in position men and horses commenced to fall under a
well-directed fire from the Confederate sharpshooters concealed in the
thicket of pines at short range. The guns were placed, however,
and fire opened on the enemy's lines, driving the sharpshooters from
their place of concealment. Here a mistake occurred that proved to be
one of the prime factors in the defeat of McDowell's army. A regiment
approached the batteries from the right in plain view. Griffin charged
his guns with canister and trained them on the advancing line, when Maj.
Barry, chief of artillery, assured him that it was a regiment coming to
his support. Griffin ordered the gunners to withhold their fire, the
regiment continued to advance until within short musket range when they
leveled their pieces and with one volley almost annihilated the
batteries. Most of the horses were killed, and those that were left
broke away and went tearing down the hill through the Union lines,
scattering confusion among the troops. The 11th N. Y. (Ellsworth's
zouaves), supporting the batteries, fired one volley and fled, upon
which the Confederates swarmed out of the woods and charged the
batteries, which now became the center of the fight. Jackson's men
seized the guns and tried to drag them away, but were foiled in the
attempt. Arnold's battery was brought to the assistance of Griffin and
Ricketts, but was compelled to withdraw. The Rhode Island batter, poured
in a heavy fire from the hill north of Young's branch, fresh troops on
either side were thrown forward and for an hour the battle raged around
the two batteries. Three times the guns were taken and recaptured and
just as victory was about to perch on the Union banner the remainder of
the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah arrived on the field. Kirby
Smith's brigade marched up the Sudley road from Manassas. Smith was
wounded, but Col. Arnold Elzey assumed command and led the brigade to
the left of the Confederate line. About the same time four regiments
from Cocke's and Bonham's brigades came up nearer Bull Run, thus
extending the enemy's line in both directions until it overlapped
McDowell's at either end. No more fresh troops could be brought up by
McDowell, while the enemy was now constantly receiving accessions to his
ranks. The guns of Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries were in Jackson's
hands, Ricketts was wounded and a prisoner, many of the Union regiments
had exhausted their ammunition, and now at 4:30 p. m. there was nothing
left but to retreat. McDowell made the best disposition he could to
cover the retreat of the army and the word was passed along the lines to
fall back to the old position at Centerville. The disorder which had
been growing in the Federal lines all the afternoon now reached its
climax. Although the Warrenton road was open to Centerville, a distance
of about 4 miles, most of the troops went back by the same route they
had come upon the field in the morning, and made the long detour by way
of Sudley ford. With few exceptions all regimental and brigade
formations were entirely lost, every man being intent on getting to
Centerville as soon as possible. Fortunately for the panic-stricken army
of raw troops Johnston and Beauregard did not press the pursuit to the
extent they might have done. Stuart's cavalry followed but the rear of
the army was fairly well protected and all the Confederates could do was
to pick up a straggler here and there. Bonham was ordered to move
against the retreating army, but the brigades of Sherman, Schenck and
Keyes, which went by the pike, presented too formidable an appearance
and the pursuit was a tame affair. Bonham followed, however, nearly to
Centerville, where he encountered the brigades of Blenker, Richardson
and Davies, and hurriedly fell back across Bull Run.
While the main battle was taking place near the crossing
of the Warrenton pike and the Sudley road a considerable skirmish
occurred at Blackburn's ford. It will be remembered that Richardson was
sent here to make a demonstration to divert attention from McDowell's
real purpose. In the afternoon the Confederates became aware of the
character of this movement and Johnston sent word to D. R. Jones
to cross the run and attack Richardson, in the hope that McDowell would
weaken his forces on the right to strengthen his position at the ford.
Davies was sent to the support of Richardson, and with him was Hunt's
battery. About 4 o'clock, Jones crossed at McLean's ford, a short
distance below Blackburn's, with three regiments, and by a flank
movement tried to capture this battery. Davies, from a strong position,
watched the movement until the regiments were beginning to deploy in
line of battle, when he ordered the 6 guns shotted with canister,
and at a distance of 500 yards opened on the advancing Confederates. One
volley was sufficient. The enemy broke and fled, not stopping until he
was safely on the other side of the run. Jones reported his loss here as
14 killed and 62 wounded. No further demonstration was made at this
point and the Union troops retired toward Centerville. The Union losses
at Bull Run were 460 killed, 1,124 wounded and 1,312 captured or
missing. The Confederates lost 387 killed, 1,582 wounded and 13 missing.
Source: The Union Army, vol. 5
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